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NEGOTIATION BY FIRE: POLITICAL LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON THE
COMBATANTS IN THE OCTOBER 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.A., George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 1977
M.A., Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1984

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ABSTRACT

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COMBATANTS IN THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR by MAJ Charles
T. Gaul, USA, 94 pages.

This study examines the principal combatants in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, (simply referred to as the October War), from a historical perspective to determine if political factors played a significant role in decision making on the battlefield. Using Clausewitz' concept that war is a means to a political end, not an end in itself, as a framework for analysis, the conduct of the war from the Egyptian and Israeli perspectives is described in detail. The October War is dealt with within this framework as opposed to a purely force-on-force description of military operations.

Political limitations or constraints are evaluated on three levels. The first level is friction or relations among military leaders and staffs. The second political level is the relation of the military commands and senior staff with the political leadership of their respective countries. The third level of political constraints examined is the relation of the political leadership to outside actors, such as the superpowers.

Implications for the future use of U. S. forces are analyzed. Lessons learned from the October War that continue to be relevant to U. S. planners are discussed.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

To the naive, war is the total abandonment of politics and the use of unlimited force to destroy an opponent. Although the twentieth century has witnessed total wars with a level of destruction and savagery unprecedented in history, war remains the use of force, carefully controlled, to attain specific, often limited, ends. There is nothing new in this formulation. Nearly a century ago, Clausewitz stated:

war is therefore a continuation of policy by other means. It is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse by other means.

He continued his definition by writing, "the political design is the object, while war is the means, and the means can never be thought of apart from the object."¹

This statement has acquired the stature of a shibboleth because it is demonstrably true. The Yom Kippur or Ramadan War of October, 1973 (hereafter simply referred to as the October War) bears eloquent testimony to the utility of armed force and its inextricable connection to the political and diplomatic structure of the international system. Clausewitz might have been baffled by the

logistics, but the political manifestations of the war would have been familiar. Implicit in his formulation is the ascendancy of political over purely military considerations. The October War illustrates the limitations placed on the conduct of a war by political forces, both internal (i.e., within the combatants' own political system) and external (i.e., actors not directly involved in the conflict).

On the 6th of October, 1973 at five minutes past 2:00 pm, the Egyptians and the Syrians began a coordinated attack against Israel with the purpose of regaining territory lost in the 1967 Six Day War. After initial success on both fronts, including Egypt's spectacular assault crossing of the Suez Canal, there followed vigorous Israeli counterattacks. By the time the war ended in a cease fire on 24 October 1973 all the combatants had suffered grievous losses in men and materiel. It did not end in stalemate, however: Egypt ultimately did regain most of its territory through negotiation. Israel did not lose either, concluding the first formal peace treaty with an Arab adversary and gaining a secure border with Egypt. The six year long status quo had been broken through the use of armed conflict as a political instrument.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the political limitations placed on the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Egyptian armed forces during the October War. It is organized into four chapters: 1. Introduction; 2. Israel;

3. Egypt; and 4. Conclusions and Implications. The introduction provides the necessary background for placing the October War in context. Chapters Two and Three analyze the war from the perspectives of the major combatants, Israel and Egypt. The final chapter draws some conclusions about the war and the lessons learned that continue to have implications for U.S. defense policy today.

War does not take place in a vacuum. Armies always struggle against limitations: political; materiel; tactical; strategic. Israel and Egypt are no exception. During the October War, they faced all of these restrictions and they were each important factors in the outcome. These factors cannot easily be separated or dissected one by one. They operate in concert and must be examined the same way. The primacy of political ends over military means dictates a focus above the tactical level, but a thorough analysis must also consider the military as well as the political situation.

The limitations placed on the military can also be broken down into four general areas: materiel; tactical; strategic; and political. Materiel limitations include logistical factors, operational limitations of equipment, and survivability. Tactical limitations are natural (e.g., terrain confronting a unit) and acquired (e.g., disposition of forces, quality of personnel). Strategic limitations acquire political rather than purely military significance.

They comprise the will of a nation and its military to support a war and the available military and political resources to implement policy and attain strategic goals. Political limitations involve three general dimensions. One, the internal military, that is, the relationships between senior military commanders and the civilian leadership. Two, internal political, that is, the internal workings of the prime minister, cabinet, and other civil authorities. Three, external political, that is, the role of actors outside of the immediate conflict, including the superpowers and such international organizations as the United Nations.

Although these categories are somewhat arbitrary and may sometimes overlap, they facilitate an understanding of a very complicated process: fighting a war and maintaining peace. Some issues involve all of these levels of analysis but influence them to different degrees. For example, the issue of defensible borders requires consideration of logistical factors, tactical disposition of forces, and the political consequences of maintaining occupied territory. Primarily, however, it is a strategic question since it involves the goal of maintaining the existence of the state and depends on the determination of the nation and its leadership to act in the face of concerted opposition. Resupply during the October War is another example. Material limitations are obviously involved, but since

Israel had to rely on United States support, and Egypt on the Soviet Union, they were also a political issue. The relative effectiveness of the combatants and their equipment remains both a technical and a tactical question.

This war was also a "Limited War" in the classical sense of being restricted in geographic scope and time. Just as important it was a war of limited aims: Egypt and Syria wanted to restore lost territory, not destroy Israel, a goal outside their combined capabilities. Today the October War would be characterized as a "regional conflict" and as such may be useful to study as an example of how violent, dangerous, and sudden a short war can be. It also underscores the lethality and distribution of weapons throughout the world twenty years ago, a situation that has not improved.

The intent of this paper is not to address all these limiting factors in detail, but to focus on political limitations in the broadest sense. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis had to cope with internal or domestic considerations, pressure from the superpowers, and in the case of the Egyptians, a coalition that included a coordinated command structure with the Syrians and advice from most of the Arab world.

Israel

Chapter Two examines the October War from Israel's perspective. To facilitate analysis the war can be broken down into four segments chronologically:

Phase I Pre War

Phase II Invasion and Stabilization of the Fronts

Phase III Israel's Counterattacks

Phase IV Conclusion and Cease Fire

Phase I begins with the realization that although war was believed to be unlikely, the Syrians and Egyptians were staging unusually heavy annual maneuvers, and concludes with the start of the War.

Phase II begins with the nearly simultaneous pre-invasion artillery and air bombardment of Israel by Syria and Egypt, and concludes with stabilization of the Northern Front in the Golan, and the Southern Front in Sinai (roughly 6-9 October).

Phase III begins with the northern counter offensive of 10-14 October and concludes with the southern counterattacks that ended in a virtual stalemate (about 10-15 October).

Phase IV includes the final battles with Syria, the recapture of Mount Hermon, the successful Suez Canal crossing (and subsequent exploitation on the West Bank), and concludes with the final cease fire of 24 October.

These divisions reflect a logical pattern of ebb and flow on the battlefield and in the political arena.

Egypt

Chapter Three deals with the Egyptian side of the war, and can also be divided into four phases. As is the case of the examination of the Israeli side, these phases too are arbitrary and are not intended to imply an official Egyptian version of events.

Phase I Preparations for Invasion

Phase II The Crossing and Defense Against
Counterattacks

Phase III Consolidation and Attacks Out of the
Bridgehead

Phase IV Isolation of the East Bank and Cease Fire

Phase I begins with the concentration of troops and equipment on the West Bank of the Suez Canal roughly thirty days prior to the invasion and ends on the evening of 6 October 1973 with the lodgement of troops on the East Bank.

Phase II begins with the construction on the bridges on the night of 6 October 1973 and lasts through the Israeli counterattacks of 8 through 13 October 1973.

Phase III begins with the decision to widen the bridgehead with attacks along a broad front on 14 October 1973 through the Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal to the West Bank.

Phase IV begins with the isolation of the Second and Third Egyptian Armies and ends with the final cease fire of 24 October 1973.

These Phases do not exactly correlate between the combatants, but they are useful in analyzing the complicated maneuvering on, and off, the battlefield. (See Table following) Differences in perception, command and control, the flow of information from battlefield to decision makers, and a large amount of Clausewitz' notion of friction, make this conflict difficult to simplify to specific time lines. An example of this phenomenon is that General Ismail, the Egyptian Defense Minister and Commander in Chief, had made his decision to attack out of the lodgement on the East Bank at almost the same time that General Elazar, the IDF Chief of Staff, had approved the Israeli assault across the Canal to the West Bank, not out of prescience, but accident.

PHASE	DATES	
	Egypt	Israel
I	October 1972 to October 1973	2-6 October 1973
II	6-11 October 1973	6-9 October 1973
III	11-16 October 1973	10-15 October 1973
IV	16-24 October 1973	16-24 October 1973

Table: A Comparason of the Timing of Phases in the 1973 October War

Background of the Conflict

It is important to realize that the combatants did not arrive on the battlefield without historical baggage. In the aftermath of the June 1967 Six Day War both sides subjected their armed forces to rigorous analysis and reorganization. The lessons each learned, or thought they had learned, had profound effects on how this war was fought. The War of Attrition from 1968 through 1970 also conditioned military attitudes. Underlying this recent history is the broader scope of the Arab-Israeli struggle and the entrenched attitudes it brought to this war.

The stunning Israeli successes in the Six Day War led to fundamental changes in the organization of the IDF. Underlying these changes was the sure and certain knowledge that another war was an unlikely prospect. Israeli General Ariel Sharon was quoted three days after the war:

We managed to finish it all, and after our success this time, I am very much afraid that by the time of the next war we are all going to be too old, and the next generation will have to take care of it, because we have now completed everything in such a way that the enemy is not going to be able to fight for many, many years to come.²

This attitude was pervasive, and did not provide a rational basis for reorganizing the armed forces. The strength of this conviction also became a significant factor in the underestimation of Egyptian capabilities.

The mechanism of the victory was a combination of the aggressive use of air power, skilled armored forces, and

highly effective command and control. The cleverly devised pre-emptive attacks against the Egyptian Air Force destroyed most of its aircraft on the ground. It vindicated the increased emphasis the IDF had placed on air power after 1956.³ The IAF commander, General Ezer Weizman, had estimated that the Egyptian Air Force could be destroyed on the ground in less than twelve hours.⁴ In the event, it took less time. Unfortunately this led the IDF to overestimate the utility of air power as an all purpose answer to warfare.⁵ Even the War of Attrition, from 1969-1970, with its extensive use of anti-aircraft missiles, failed to change the IDF's optimistic outlook.

The skill and speed of the IDF use of armor in the Six Day War led to the continuation of trends in organization that began in 1956. The organization of the ground forces for combat put an emphasis on tanks to the point that infantry was nearly eliminated. As General David Elazar, a former chief of the armored corps put it, "After the air force, armor is the factor that decides the fate of battle on land."⁶ The IDF had been strongly influenced by British theorists such as Liddel-Hart and J. F. C. Fuller and its experience against the Egyptians seemed to support this bias.⁷ This recent combat experience, coupled with a preexisting prejudice for armor, was to have devastating effects in the October War. During the course of the war artillery and mortar fire were used to some effect, however,

without trained infantry, capable of fighting dismounted, the IDF fell easy prey to a new generation of anti-tank weapons.

The clearest edge the Israelis held over the Egyptians was in command and control, and leadership. Israeli tactical leadership was more flexible, aggressive, and dynamic on the battlefield. Coordination between units at brigade and higher levels was significantly better than any Arab army at the time. Higher level military leadership was also superior, especially when it came to planning operations.⁸

With all the advantages the IDF enjoyed in 1967, it becomes difficult to understand the results of the October War. The lessons learned from the Six Day War were all based on an erroneous assumption: the Arab soldier has negligible fighting qualities and will not materially improve in the near term. This conviction, coupled with a reliance on aircraft and pure tank forces, actually put Israel at a disadvantage.

Rarely is a defeat considered an advantage, but when Egypt set out to rebuild her armed forces she was not blinded by recent glory. The most serious shortcoming, command and control, was immediately addressed by instituting a series of elaborate command post exercises.⁹ Individual training and the preparation of junior leaders was also emphasized.

Many of Egypt's disadvantages were material in nature, and not easily or quickly remedied. The Soviet Union continued to be the principle supplier of arms to Egypt, for a price. Timing of deliveries, their quantity and quality, was a source of continual tension between the two countries.¹⁰ Innovation, finding novel solutions to military problems out of necessity, was Egypt's answer (see Chapter 3).

An important part of this reconstruction was a change in attitude on the part of the general staff, fueled by the sweeping reorganization of the government carried out by Nasser in 1967.¹¹ Realistic and objective planning, a recognition of the limitations imposed by the international system, and an understanding of technical military limitations characterized this period.¹² Reflecting this new determination, the period between the wars was divided into four phases: Defiance, June 1967 to August 1968; Active Defence, September 1968 to February 1969; War of Attrition, March 1969 to August 1970; and No Peace, No War, August 1970 to October 1973.¹³ Of these periods, the War of Attrition is most significant in analyzing the October War.

The War of Attrition was a chance to test new ideas and equipment without risking total war and superpower involvement. More important for Egypt, it was a chance to build morale and offensive spirit in an army lacking both after the Six Day War. On March 8th, 1969 President Nasser

made a formal announcement of the opening of the War of Attrition, coinciding with an artillery bombardment.¹⁴ Its objectives, as stated by then Chief of Staff General Riadh were: destroy the Bar-Lev Line fortifications, prevent their reconstruction, make life intolerable for Israeli forces on the East Bank of the Suez Canal, inspire offensive spirit in Egyptian troops, and to carry out practice Canal crossings.¹⁵

Operationally the War was characterized by commando raids by both the Israelis and the Egyptians across the Canal, lengthy artillery exchanges, and air strikes.¹⁶ Despite the construction of a formidable anti-aircraft barrier by the Egyptians with extensive Soviet assistance, Israeli planes continued to raid with losses acceptable to the IDF.¹⁷ This air defense problem led Egypt to request more direct involvement by the Soviets, including Soviet manned fighter squadrons for the defense of Cairo and Aswan.¹⁸ This virtual stalemate was ended with a U.S. sponsored, Soviet supported cease-fire in August, 1970. The Israeli's were confirmed in their belief of technical and tactical superiority, although they continued to strengthen the Bar-Lev Line. The Egyptians had shown themselves capable of crossing the Canal, at least in raids, and that unconventional means must be used to blunt the IDF in areas such as fighter aircraft where Egypt could not compete on an even footing.¹⁹

The real purpose of the War of Attrition was to concentrate attention on the Middle East with the hope of a negotiated end to the occupation of Arab territories. It was hoped that the intervention of the superpowers would lead to withdrawals in accordance with United Nations Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.

The U. S. had voted for 242, and Secretary of State William Rogers, responsible for the cease-fire negotiations that ended the War of Attrition, proposed a plan within its framework in the spring of 1969 that he hoped would lead to Israeli withdrawals and Arab acceptance of a permanent peace with Israel.²⁰ The Rogers Plan called for several ambitious undertakings including: a final and binding peace accord between Egypt and Israel, withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Egyptian territory, and a settlement of refugee problems. It is not surprising that a scheme as broad as the Rogers Plan fell far short of expectations. Both the Soviets and the Israelis raised objections to the plan, effectively ending the initiative before negotiations could start in earnest. This period of No Peace, No War, left the Egyptians frustrated and no better off than they had been in 1967. With the failure of the Rogers Plan the October War became inevitable.

The role of the superpowers in Mid-East conflicts is highly complex. Not only did both the Soviet Union and the United States assist in the termination of the war, they

also contributed to its outbreak by supplying the means. If there has been one salient change since 1973 it is the end of the bipolar world. In 1973, however, superpower conflict meant that regional conflicts could have the risk of becoming general. The superpowers' relations with their respective clients or allies were far from smooth and both found that considerable arm twisting was required before the conflict could end.

In the United States domestic politics became a severely complicating factor with the Vice President forced to resign over tax evasion charges, and President Nixon preoccupied with the Watergate episode. These distractions must have made concentration on diplomacy very difficult and may have complicated his response. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, while no stranger to conflict, had only recently assumed his office.²¹

The Soviet Union had the one advantage conveyed by a nondemocratic government and a state controlled press, it could pursue its interests single mindedly. Soviet relations in the Arab world were not smooth, however, and Leonid Brezhnev must have felt the pressure of having to maintain the credibility of Soviet promises to clients against the potential damage to detente with the U.S.

The United Nations today seems the logical place to have resolved this conflict, with the assistance of the superpowers. In 1973, however, it was only another broker

in a complicated arrangement that included nationalism, religion, and oil. Israel paid little attention to the UN after 1967 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 that would have required Israel to return at least some of the Occupied Territories. Similarly, the Egyptians could have little faith in the UN since it had not made any progress on implementing 242, or in any other measure that could have restored her borders to pre Six Day War status.

Syria

A detailed analysis of the Syrian perspective of the war is outside the scope of this study and will be discussed only in relation to the Egyptians and Israelis. A brief review of events on the Northern Front is necessary, however, to put the Egyptian and Israeli behavior in the October War in context.

Syria, like Egypt, had a specific goal for the war: regain territory lost to Israel during the Six Day War in 1967 and prove the fighting ability of the Syrian armed forces. Recovery of the Golan Heights was considered a strategic necessity since they overlook the road to Damascus. To accomplish this task the Syrians concentrated three divisions in the first echelon and two in the second, one of which was to be held as a general reserve. The operational plan was devised on a Soviet model, reflecting the training the Syrians had been receiving for the preceding fifteen years. The Syrian plan called for a rapid

violent attack that would seize the objective quickly, before the Israelis had a chance to mobilize. The plan had a vaguely formulated sequel in the event of a very rapid success, but like the Egyptian plan, it was not detailed.²² After a short, intense, artillery barrage synchronized with the Egyptian attack the Syrians advanced along a broad front extending over 65 kilometers.²³

Assaulting the Israeli Purple Line was hardly less formidable than crossing the Suez Canal. Unlike the Bar-Lev Line, the Purple Line was fully manned with regular soldiers. The forts were also far better constructed than those of the Bar-Lev Line and had interlocking fields of fire. Protecting these emplacements was an anti-tank ditch four to six meters wide that would canalize the attacker by forcing the use of assault bridges. Simultaneous with the ground attack, commandos were inserted onto the top of Mount Hermon where the Israelis had an important observation post.²⁴

The Syrians had some initial success, but not as dramatic as the Egyptians. The Syrians had not mastered battlefield circulation to the extent the Egyptians had and units began to arrive at the anti-tank ditch with their engineer assets in the rear of their column causing delays.²⁵ Despite these problems, and high casualties, the Syrians made progress along most of the front during the first day.

The Golan is not important to Syria alone, however, and the Israelis identified the Northern Front as the more critical of the two threats. Having the depth of Sinai to maneuver in if necessary allowed the IDF to reinforce in the Golan first. The Syrians continued to press their attacks seemingly unconcerned over the losses they were suffering through the first day. It is unlikely, however, that they would have enjoyed any degree of success without the Egyptian attack in the south.

Despite the shock and violence of their attacks the Syrians began to lose momentum by the 8th of October. The Israelis began counterattacking as soon as reserves began arriving and quickly regained the initiative. By the morning of the 11th of October the Israelis were attacking across the Purple Line into Syrian territory. The Israeli Air Force had established dominance by defeating the Syrian air defense network and began to have a significant effect on the ground war by the time they were ready to begin their advance into Syria.²⁶

It was at this critical juncture that the Northern Front was to influence the outcome in the south. Faced with severe losses, and afraid of an Israeli attack toward Damascus, the Syrians pleaded with the Egyptians to stage a major breakout into Sinai to relieve the pressure on the Golan. The exact sequence of events is obscured by the bitterness that grew out of conflicting aims. President

Asad has maintained that the Egyptians had told the Syrians that they planned an all out attack in Sinai, at least to the Gidi and Mitla Passes.²⁷ Egyptian sources, especially General Shazly make clear that they had no such ambitious intent.²⁸ Sadat wrote that the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt had approached him as early as the 6th of October asking for a cease fire on Syria's behalf.²⁹ Sadat claimed to have contacted Asad who replied on the 7th that the Soviet Ambassador was mistaken about the progress of the war.³⁰ In an officially sanctioned Egyptian history of the war, General Ismail is given credit for the offensive of the 14th of October that had the expressed intent of relieving pressure on the Syrians.³¹

There are many possible explanations for this discrepancy. The reverses suffered by both sides would lead to acrimony no matter what had been previously agreed. The complex nature of joint or combined planning required by a coalition also is a factor. The only thing the coalition clearly adhered to was the timing of the initiation of hostilities. The goals of the respective combatants were similar only in the most general of terms: regain lost territory. Although both relied on surprise, the Syrians appear to have wanted to seize their objectives quickly and then ask for a cease fire. The Egyptians clearly thought the war would last more than a few days. The Egyptian attack of the 14th of October (discussed in greater detail

in Chapter Three) was a tactical disaster and did little to change the outcome in the north.

The situation in the Golan quickly shifted from bad to worse for the Syrians. Having failed to reach their objectives, and suffering grave losses in men and materiel, the Syrians lost the initiative on the battlefield by the 13th of October.³² Israeli long range artillery was now able to fire on Damascus, albeit with little practical, but great psychological effect. The strategic observation point of Mount Hermon fell to an Israeli commando attack on the 22nd of October, shortly before the cease-fire went into effect.

Conclusion

The implications of the October War for the U. S. today will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Four, however it is important to note the changes since 1973 and be aware of how fragile those changes are. The possibility of conflict with a superpower over a client state are remote for at least a decade, if not longer, simply because that is the most optimistic time line for a resurgent Russia or emergent China to pose a threat. It is not unlikely that a situation involving a remote ally in a regional conflict could arise that would require the deployment of U. S. forces. The growing importance of the U. N. in regional conflicts is due not to a new found respect for international norms, but to the vacuum left by the end of

the ideological struggle that characterized the bi-polar world. To maintain these changes, particularly the credibility of the U. N. will require the U. S. to remain engaged in regional issues to a far greater degree than it did in the Middle East in the period of 1967 to 1973.

A Note on Sources

In analyzing any conflict, especially any Arab-Israeli conflict, careful evaluation of sources is necessary. Despite the Camp David Accords, and the passage of nearly twenty years, there are still significant differences between accounts of the October War, both between and among the combatants. This war fueled speculation and recrimination out of proportion to its length but not to its political consequences. Arab sources are historically less accessible and sometimes unreliable. The Israelis limited on-the-spot news coverage, effectively censoring the press, and have yet to make the post war inquiry, the Agranat Commission Report, available to the public. The public debate and interest in this war has fostered many excellent memoirs and some relatively objective histories. Judicious comparisons allow reliable conclusions to be drawn about the limitations imposed on the IDF and the Egyptian Armed Forces during the October War.

CHAPTER TWO

ISRAEL

Phase I: Pre War

The first shots of the October War were fired at approximately 1405 hours, 6 October 1973. The simultaneous attacks of the Egyptians and Syrians represented the culmination of months of preparation. Scheduling the offensive to coincide with the holiest day in the Jewish calendar intensified the shock factor, but was not the only reason for the surprise. The depth and force of the shock had their origins in the 5 through 10 June 1967 "Six Day War" and the Israeli's dependence on deterrence.

The success of Israel in the Six Day War earned her armed forces justifiable accolades. The effectiveness of her air and armored forces led to changes in tactics and organization when many armies would have been content with the status quo.³³ Victory can shed a blinding light as well as a satisfying glow. More secure borders and new sophisticated weapons, coupled with the memory of a spectacular success, combined to make Israel over-confident in her ability to resist Arab assaults. Her position was not helped by a world-wide acceptance of her status as a regional military superpower. The corollary of the image of

Israeli superiority was Arab inferiority: Egypt and Syria would not attack again and face a repetition of their humiliation.

The War of Attrition that was waged between the Egyptians and the Israelis from the end of 1968 through the middle of 1970 seemed to underscore the unwillingness of the Arabs to risk a total war.³⁴ This apparent stalemate - the no peace, no war period - enabled the Egyptians and Syrians to test and refine tactical doctrine. Their frustration at the lack of diplomatic momentum and their newly acquired Soviet weapons encouraged them to risk all or nothing to win some limited military gains.³⁵

To understand the extent of the strategic surprise that the Arabs were able to obtain, it is necessary to examine the pre war intelligence estimates of the Arab capabilities and intentions, and the extent of their deception plan. The tactical and operational crises early in the war and the crucial decisions about mobilization and the virtue of pre-emption are all related to the estimate of the situation before the outbreak of hostilities.

There was reason for Israel to be confident of her ability to offset Arab numerical superiority. Having a small population and standing army requires heavy reliance on reserve forces. As a result of this reliance, Israel has developed the most efficient system of mobilization in the world. Efficient as this system is, it is not instantaneous

and requires at least three days to become fully operable.³⁶ This delay necessitates early warning in case of an impending attack. Military intelligence was convinced that it could provide this early warning at least eight hours ahead of time.³⁷ As long as this lead time was available there was little chance of an Arab military adventure succeeding. The drawback of relying on advance warning is that accurate estimates of enemy intentions must always be available and mobilization must be undertaken whenever there is a strong likelihood of attack.

Military intelligence is as susceptible to bureaucratic inertia as any human organization. Israeli Military Intelligence is no exception. For several years prior to the Yom Kippur War, an idea called "The Concept" had dominated intelligence circles.³⁸ The Concept postulated two preconditions for an Arab attack: (1) Egypt's Air Force would have to neutralize the Israeli air force before attacking on the ground; (2) Syria would not attack unless Egypt attacked simultaneously.³⁹ The first condition was considered so unlikely as to make war improbable. The second condition was dependent on the first. The Concept was also seriously flawed by the belief that the overwhelming defeats suffered by the Arabs in the 1967 Six Day War had convinced the Egyptians and Syrians that any serious attack was irrational and doomed to failure in the face of Israel's obvious qualitative military

superiority. The Concept took into account the new defensible borders that the occupied territories provided which the IDF thought gave them an unprecedented military advantage.⁴⁰

The War of Attrition should have shown the Israelis that in the absence of a strong fighter-interceptor based air force the Egyptians might choose an indirect approach: strong air defense to neutralize enemy air superiority. This option should have been obvious since the Arabs had continually shown themselves inferior to the Israelis in air combat. As recently as September 13, 1973, when the Israelis and Syrians clashed in the air, Israeli superiority had been confirmed.⁴¹

The Concept was not the only flaw in the intelligence system. The departure of dependents of Soviet military advisors from Egypt and Syria shortly before the war began was a clear indication of impending hostilities. Unfortunately, this indicator was seen in light of Egypt's 1972 expulsion of Soviet advisors and another example of President Sadat's mercurial relationship with Moscow. This is a clear example of faulty analysis of good information: the Israelis were immediately aware of the event, but misjudged its importance. There are other examples of a failure of the analysis process: troop movements in the Golan consistent with offensive operations; and the establishment of a command and control network in Egypt

totally out of proportion to the scheduled annual exercises in the Suez area.

In defense of the IDF intelligence establishment it must be noted that the degree of operational security practiced by the Arabs and the elaborate deception plan were extremely competent and difficult to assess. In the field such measures as having Egyptian soldiers fishing in the Suez Canal and not revealing the time of the attack to brigade commanders until one hour before supporting fires were to commence, eliminated any discovery of Egypt's true intentions.

A more sinister deception prospect is the possibility that a train bearing Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union to Austria enroute to Israel was hijacked on the 28th of September with the express purpose of diverting attention from developments in the Middle East. The hijackers, calling themselves the "Eagles of the Palestine Revolution", demanded that the Austrians close the Schonau Castle transit facility used by Jews as a stopover and processing point on their journey to Israel.⁴² Prime Minister Meir called the news of the incident devastating.⁴³ While there has been speculation that this incident was undertaken by the Syrians, proof is lacking. Regardless of who was behind the incident it became another element in the background noise that the Israeli leadership and intelligence system had to contend with.

Misunderstanding an enemy's intentions is not only an intelligence failure it is a leadership failure as well. In their memoirs, both Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan admit that in September they had become convinced that hostilities were imminent.⁴⁴ In spite of these convictions, little was done to expedite mobilization. Dayan was sufficiently concerned about Syrian movements in the Golan Heights to recommend strengthening armored forces in the area just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. He also recommended strengthening forces in Sinai, but not as forcefully.⁴⁵

In the face of obvious preparations for war the political leadership did not allow the military to mobilize. This is an excellent example of a political limitation of the military. The Chief of Staff, David Elazar, requested mobilization based on intelligence indicators that war was imminent on at least a limited scale as early as the 3rd of October, but Dayan said no. As Dayan put it, "It is almost a tradition in the Israeli Defense Forces for the military chiefs to urge more activity....It is for the political authority to impose limitations."⁴⁶ Elazar was disappointed but could do little against Dayan's opposition. There is evidence that he stretched the limited mobilization authority granted him by placing as many personnel on alert as he thought would not arouse suspicion.⁴⁷

Mobilization has political consequences which Mrs. Meir had to consider. Israel's dependence on reserves can have severe economic effects. In May of 1973, Israel had gone through a total mobilization on the advice of military intelligence. The absence of a considerable proportion of the civilian labor force cost the country a great deal. Mobilization in October would not only dislocate the civilian economy but also jeopardize Mrs. Meir's chances in the coming election if it proved to be another false alarm.

Other considerations were the regional and international political consequences of mobilization. Dayan was anxious to assure the United States that Israel was interested in preventing war.⁴⁸ Dayan was convinced that mobilization would alert the Arabs and give them a pretext for an attack on the grounds of self defense.⁴⁹ Dayan convinced Elazar to make a public statement in support of this position. Elazar accepted the decision not to mobilize "not only because I as an officer carry out the policies of the civilian government, but also because I was persuaded that full mobilization would be a blunder."⁵⁰ The Chief of Staff had suggested mobilization by broadcast signal, the fastest means, but the least secure. In this Dayan was probably right: it would have served Arab propagandists.

Mobilization was not the only conflict between Dayan and Elazar. Pre-emption was another. Effective use of air power had bought Israel time in 1967. Elazar would have

liked to use this technique again. Dayan overruled him for two reasons: he thought that the proposed strikes against Syrian air bases would be ineffective; and he was afraid that pre-emption might adversely affect United States support.⁵¹ Considering the early losses suffered by the Israelis against the Egyptian and Syrian missile barriers, these air strikes probably would not have had a major effect on the outcome of the initial attacks.

Phase II: Invasion and Stabilization of the Fronts

The first phase of the war was apocalyptic. Despite definite warning in the early morning hours of Yom Kippur that an Arab attack was imminent, no one was prepared for it to start as early in the day or with such ferocious fire power. The Northern and Southern fronts had two things in common: high, early losses; and shock at the speed of the offensive. The Egyptian canal crossing and the Syrian armored attack had no precedents. Exacerbating the initial shock were poor tactical deployments along the Suez Canal and a severe shortage of forces in the Golan.

The conduct of the early phase of the war on the Southern Front reveals several problems endemic to the IDF. The friction between commanders, weakness of political leadership, connections between the military and political leadership, and unsettled questions all illustrate the tactical limitations of the military.

The earliest crisis in the South involved the Bar Lev Line and its function. Fixed fortifications, like mines or other obstacles, are only useful if under constant observation with supporting fires on call to counter their natural susceptibility to flank attacks. The Bar Lev Line was no exception to this rule. Its purpose was not to act as a Maginot Line, stopping an assault at the water's edge, it was intended to be a series of elaborate observation points that could direct fires and armored counterattacks.⁵² Unfortunately, all the armor assets dedicated to support the forts were not in position when the attack began. Several reasons are given for this: many regular soldiers were on leave for the Yom Kippur holiday; forward deployment would make them vulnerable; armor should be saved until the enemy axis of attack becomes known. Also, Dayan may have suggested extreme circumspection in preparations for war so as not to give the Arabs a pretext to attack.⁵³

General Gonen, Southern Front Commander, had been alerted about the attack, but expected it four hours later than it came. The role of the Bar Lev Line itself thus bears examining. Originally designed to be a true series of strongholds, it had been allowed to deteriorate while General Arik Sharon had been Southern Commander. His point of view was that armor and other mobile forces win wars. The fortifications were only suitable for observation posts.

The Bar Lev fortifications were strong points in name only on the day the War began⁵⁴ The loss of these installations then was due to a faulty tactical concept, coupled with poor execution.

Conflict between commanders on the Southern Front, particularly between Gonen and Sharon, had a detrimental effect on the conduct of operations. Sharon, Gonen's senior not long before the war, is famous for his independence and abrasive manner. Dayan admits having been tempted to "murder" Sharon at times, but called him the best field commander he knew.⁵⁵ It is not rare in the IDF to have a commander go into the reserves and become subordinate to an officer he previously commanded, as was the case in the Southern Front. It is rare in any army to tolerate the kind of disobedience shown by Sharon. Whenever he was faced with an order he did not approve of, he wasted no time in going directly over Gonen's head to General Dov Sion, Deputy Chief of Operations, or anyone else who would listen.⁵⁶ Sharon's position in the Likkud Party, then in opposition, and his personal political aspirations, probably encouraged this behavior. But these factors do not excuse that behavior. Dayan had little confidence in Gonen and suggested he be relieved on 9 October.⁵⁷ As part of a face saving compromise, General Bar Lev was sent to Southern Command, ostensibly as an observer, practically as a new commander. Sharon showed little more respect for Bar Lev.⁵⁸

These internal political frictions within an army can have grave consequences on morale and the conduct of operations. Representing an opposition political party gives a soldier no right to subvert the chain of command or to belittle his superiors, especially during a war. In the IDF however this behavior is far from unknown.

The political leadership also had an effect on the Southern Front. Dayan's pessimism and his recommendation to withdraw to the passes may have had an adverse effect on morale, and hence, on combat capability. Such a withdrawal would have given the Egyptians what they wanted. This limitation in resolve was luckily not shared by the Prime Minister who sided with Elazar and ordered counterattacks.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, the counterattack of 9 October was very poorly handled, serving only to further damage Gonen's reputation.

In the tactical sphere, the fighting in Sinai taught two important lessons: tanks must be supported by infantry; and, the defense has the advantage when dispositions are properly arranged. The importance of tactics involves more than the conduct of a skirmish. Tactics influence combat performance and casualty rates, which in turn have great political importance. Although the Egyptians were embarking on a strategic offense, their method once the canal had been crossed was defensive. It was an infantry heavy defense that the initial Israeli counterattacks had to face. The

high density of modern anti-tank weapons took a staggering toll of Israeli armor and indicated the importance of infantry on the modern battlefield and the vulnerability of armor. This is an example of both a materiel and a tactical limitation, with the corrective action being modified tactics to confront the threat.

The battles on the Northern Front were characterized by equal violence but the command did not have the political turmoil found in the South. There the offense/defense posture was reversed. The Israelis proved that a properly prepared defense with good visibility, fields of fire, and superior equipment, can fight against seemingly overwhelming numerical disadvantages. The lack of space in which to maneuver and the proximity of civilian settlements did restrict freedom of choice and made this type of defense necessary. Counterattacks in the North were undertaken first and given a preponderance of air support because the Syrians posed the most immediate threat to Israel proper.

By the end of the first week of the war, both fronts had been stabilized. This period of the war is primarily a military one. The political questions of resupply and cease fire do not yet emerge.

Phase III: Israeli Counterattacks

Great losses can be inflicted upon an adversary by staying in a defensive posture, but wars are not won on the defensive. Egypt's limited aim of securing a corridor on

the east bank of the Suez Canal was an operational or strategic offensive followed by a tactical defense against inevitable Israeli counterattacks. By contrast, the Syrians employed an offensive strategy in their attacks in the Golan and offensive tactics against a superior Israeli flexible defense.

Israel had to regain momentum on both fronts regardless of the tactics employed by her adversaries. Of the two the Northern Front was the more critical threat. The IDF accepted the risk of an Egyptian breakout because of the greater operational depth offered by the Sinai and concentrated its reserves against the Syrians.

The Northern Front counterattack was an example of the tactical superiority of the Israelis. Although greatly outnumbered, they were able to secure key terrain at crucial moments and outgun the Syrians. A materiel advantage was also enjoyed by the Israelis. Syrian armor, even the T-62, proved inferior to the Western armor employed by the IDF.

As Southern Command had realized early in the War, a tank is not suited to all offensive tasks. Unfortunately this lesson had to be learned on the Northern Front as well. In the battle for Tel Shams, the right tool for the task was infantry but foot soldiers were not employed until after a frontal armored assault was repulsed with heavy casualties.⁶⁰ Tactical limitations imposed by terrain indicated the use of infantry. At this stage of the War,

the Northern Front offensive was in the hands of the military, a purely operational exercise.

The counter offensive in the South had to wait for the Air Force to shift its emphasis from the Golan Heights. The Air Force faced a severe tactical disadvantage in the form of dense anti-aircraft fires. Once air support was available, a breakthrough to the Canal was necessary to regain the initiative.

Crossing the Canal was important for several reasons: to allow ground forces to destroy SAM sites; to cut off the Egyptians from their rear areas; and, to use territory as a bargaining chip in post war negotiations. A river crossing operation is one of the most difficult to undertake, even if the command elements are familiar with the terrain and the equipment is available. The logical place to cross the canal was between the Second and Third Egyptian Armies, just north of Great Bitter Lake.

The crossing was a typical military operation: confusion and potential disaster at every turn. Sharon again showed his cavalier disregard for risks and established a fragile lodgement on the West Bank with no bridge to bring reinforcements to him.⁶¹ Sharon grasped a fundamental principle of war: use the indirect approach and attack the enemy where he least expects you. Sharon's crossing was a tactical maneuver that had strategic implications. When he was reinforced and the exploitation

began, his forces were largely unopposed and encircled the Egyptian Third Army before it had a chance to break out.

This was a crucial moment in the War. The Canal crossing and the subsequent attacks on centers of population, such as Suez City, insured that the pressure for a cease fire would become unendurable. As much as the military might have wanted to range indefinitely into Egyptian territory on the West Bank of the Suez, or "Africa" as the Israeli's called it, the international situation, particularly the prospect of superpower confrontation, would not allow it to do so.

It was during this period of counter attacks that the interactions of a materiel limitation and external political forces posed a threat to Israel's continued ability to wage war. As early as the eighth of October, the US had been asked to allow Israeli planes to pick up cargoes of ammunition and spare parts.⁶² American reluctance to become directly involved in the conflict limited the amount and kind of supplies the Israelis could obtain. This was a maddening state of affairs because the Soviets were shipping massive quantities of supplies to the Arabs. Dayan speculates that the American reluctance was based on the assumption that Israel was overestimating the crisis.⁶³

The US could not indefinitely allow the Soviets to supply the Arabs without supplying Israel. An understanding was reached whereby all losses would be replaced on a one to

one basis. The arrival of the American aircraft probably exerted a profound effect on morale as well as on the materiel situation.

Phase IV: Conclusion and Cease Fire

The concluding phase of the War and the cease fire illustrate the role of the superpowers, particularly the US, in influencing events in the Middle East. This phase also shows the importance of time in the conduct of military operations. The IDF had to act quickly to gain military victory before a cessation of hostilities. The utility of a limited war to stimulate political or diplomatic processes was once again proven.

The Soviet Union and the United States had much to lose and little to gain in this War. If the Arab-Israeli conflict could honestly be characterized as a sort of Punch and Judy Show with the superpowers pulling the strings, they would doubtlessly be relieved. This situation obviously does not exist. Neither the US nor the USSR could predict or determine the outcome of a war. There are potentially powerful levers in their hands, such as the flow of supplies which can be manipulated in such a manner as to influence decisions, but not to determine them.

The cease fire maneuvering is clear proof that the Soviets and the Americans did not have as much control over events as the principal parties. The Soviets attempted to get the Egyptians to agree to a cease fire early in the War

because they feared Israel's superiority, once mobilized, would defeat the Egyptian forces.⁶⁴ It was not until Kosygin showed President Sadat the incontrovertible evidence of satellite photographs that the Egyptian president realized the military side of the war had been lost and a cease fire was inevitable.

Secretary of State Kissinger pursued a cease fire before either side wanted one and was unsuccessful. He realized that the war had to last until one party had been sufficiently disadvantaged so as to want an end to the fighting. At the same time, he did not want the Arabs to be humiliated because he feared the crisis might repeat itself in an effort to regain lost national pride.⁶⁵ The prospect of a superpower confrontation raised by the specter of an Egyptian defeat was sufficiently real to make Kissinger exert all his diplomatic influence on Israel to agree to a cease fire.

The violations of the 22 October cease fire are not as important as the successful cease fire of 24 October. Considering the condition of the Egyptian troops and the offensive momentum of the Israelis, violations were bound to occur.

The eighteen days of the October War and the cease fire coming while the Israelis were involved in a masterful operation on the West Bank of the Suez illustrate the time limit imposed on Arab-Israeli conflicts. As intense as the

fighting was, eighteen days would have made little difference on the Northern Front where the Syrians were emplaced in a nearly impregnable defensive line. The difference on the southern Front would have been glaring.

Internal Israeli politics were affected by the War. Even though Israel was the obvious military victor, the casualties suffered (the total never made public officially) and the strategic surprise of the Arab attack influenced the next elections. Sharon's Likkud Party made much political capital from early setbacks and blamed them entirely on the ruling Labor Party.⁶⁶

The War changed the public's image of several prominent Israelis. Elazar and Dayan both suffered and Gonen was, as General Herzog put it, "an unfortunate war casualty. His tragedy was that he arrived in Southern Command a year too late."⁶⁷ The Agranat Commission was critical of Elazar's preparations before the War, but granted absolution to Dayan.⁶⁸ This is surprising considering that Dayan writes civilian control of the military is absolute in all but operational decisions.⁶⁹

CHAPTER THREE

EGYPT

Phase I: Preparation for Invasion

The Egyptian attack that began at 1405 on the 6th of October, 1973 was meticulously planned and had been years in the making. As discussed in Chapter One, the Egyptian Armed Forces had undergone an extensive rebuilding and reorganization after the 1967 Six Day War. This effort was more than a superficial rearming or change in the formation of units, it was also a philosophical and systemic metamorphosis. The architect of many of these changes, and more importantly, for the details of planning the assault was the Chief of Staff, General Saad al Shazly. To understand the progress of the war, and the outcome, his career and role in the decision making process must first be examined.

General Shazly's background was ideal for the mission of inspiring the Egyptian army in this time of crisis. Commissioned into the infantry in 1939, he commanded Egypt's first airborne infantry battalion through the 1956 Suez campaign and later as part of the United Nations force in the Congo in 1960. Shazly's troops in Sinai in the 1967 Six Day War were one of the few units to end the war with their

fighting reputation intact. His combat exploits, and the dashing character of any paratroop officer, made him popular with junior officers. Unfortunately, rapid promotion, and the aggressive character that ensured his early promotion, made him unpopular with many senior officers. This friction would have repercussions during the war when he clashed with President Sadat and the Defense Minister, General Ismail.⁷⁰

Inspiration and aggressiveness were probably what the armed forces needed to prepare for the October War. The Egyptian high command was devastated by the losses it had suffered in the Six Day War. The catastrophic defeat had even prompted President Nasser to tender his resignation from office, but his popularity was so great with the Egyptian people it was not accepted. Despite this mood of shock, the Egyptians were determined to rebuild the armed forces to prevent a repetition of the disaster. As General Hassan el Badri said, in his history of the October War

In June, 1967, at the conclusion of the Third Round, our armed forces emerged from a painful trial. They had been pushed into an unequal battle without the slightest chance of winning. We had defeated ourselves and yielded to the enemy an easy victory which he did not rightfully deserve. The setback had the most far-reaching effects on the Arab armed forces. The lesson was heeded; all Arabs decided that such a disastrous setback would not befall them again.⁷¹

General Shazly said that the will to fight again and regain lost territory sustained morale during these dark days.⁷²

The planning for the assault across the Suez Canal began in earnest in 1968, even before the War of Attrition

was underway.⁷³ In its early stages the planning was characterized by wishful thinking that failed to match Egyptian capabilities. Two plans existed: Operation 200, and Operation Granite. Operation 200 was wholly defensive, based on fortifications and forces on the West Bank of the Suez. Operation Granite was more aggressive and called for raids across the Canal, but no sustained operations on the East Bank. When Shazly became Chief of Staff in May of 1971 these incomplete draft plans were all he inherited in the way of a strategy for regaining the Sinai.⁷⁴ His first conclusion as Chief of Staff was that

It was impossible for us to launch a large scale offensive to destroy the enemy concentrations in Sinai...all our capabilities would permit was a limited attack...cross the canal...and take up a defensive posture."⁷⁵

Even this limited goal of a crossing followed by an immediate reversion to the defense would require unconventional solutions to chronic shortcomings in Egypt's forces. Most important were the deficiencies in Egypt's air force.⁷⁶ Israel enjoyed a significant qualitative superiority in pilots and aircraft. No lodgement on the East Bank of the Canal would stand a chance if this advantage could not be neutralized. Israel's other strong suit was her armored formations. Well trained and well equipped, they were the key to the defence of the Bar Lev line by being able to mount rapid violent counterattacks against any Egyptian bridgeheads.

Technology provided an answer to both deficiencies. In order to protect the initial crossing sites an intensive "envelope" of air defense weapons, both missile and gun, would be installed on the West Bank. As soon as the crossing sites were secure, mobile missile units and self-propelled ZSU 23-4 anti-aircraft guns would cross over to extend this envelope.

To counter Israel's superiority in armor, anti-tank guns would be emplaced on the top of the Egyptian ramparts on the West Bank. The most significant innovation however, was the large number of "suitcase Sappers", Soviet portable wire-guided anti-tank missiles carried by Egyptian infantry. Even President Sadat was impressed by the concept, "The rule was that only armor should deal with armor. We were taught...that the infantry...should never engage armor...However, our highly trained infantry forces did cross into Sinai anti-tank missiles in hand, to confront Israeli tanks."⁷⁷ The result, as well reported even during the war, was a significant loss of Israeli tanks.

Even if Israeli superiority in aircraft and tanks could be neutralized, the Canal still had to be crossed and the significant earthworks on the East Bank overcome. Technology and innovation offered an unconventional answer to this problem as well. The Egyptians had been well trained in river crossing operations by their Soviet advisors, and did have modern combat engineer bridging

equipment. Unfortunately, the Israeli sand rampart, up to 20 meters high in some areas, precluded immediate emplacement of the bridges. The solution was to use portable water cannon to rapidly reduce the bank. It is difficult to establish the originator of the idea and many have claimed it. General Shazly wrote that the Director of the Engineer Corps, General Gamal Ali first demonstrated the idea to him in June of 1971.⁷⁸

With these technical problems solved planning could begin in earnest for the crossing. General Shazly began with the formulation of an attack plan code named Operation 41 that called for a 30 to 40 mile penetration into Sinai that included seizing the key Giddi and Mitla passes. This plan was actually a compromise with then Minister of War General Mohammed Ahmed Sadek who believed that anything short of a complete recapture of Sinai would be fruitless.⁷⁹ Shazly was unconvinced that even an operation limited to a 30 to 40 mile penetration was within Egypt's capabilities. He began to plan a second operation code named The High Minarets that limited a penetration to a depth of 5 to 6 miles.⁸⁰

These plans did not exist in a vacuum, although very tight security was maintained. Like his Israeli counterparts, Shazly had political pressures to contend with. General Sadek was dismissed as Minister of War in October 1972 after a political dispute with President Sadat

over the plans for starting a limited war with Israel. The main issue was one of timing. Sadak was concerned that Soviet arms deliveries, crucial for any offensive, would never meet required levels; Sadat believed they would honor their promises of renewed deliveries.⁸¹ Sadak's replacement, General Ahmed Ismail, then Director of Intelligence, and General Shazly were among the few senior officers who favored war.⁸²

To have a reasonable chance of success the attack had to be made jointly with the Syrians. Equally important was the support of other Arab states not directly involved in the fighting. Securing this support was a political problem of enormous dimensions. Fortunately General Shazly had been appointed Assistant Secretary of the Arab League for Defense in 1971, a position that allowed him to lobby for support for the war, both financial and material. This maneuvering was not without unpleasant consequences for Shazly. General Sadak, as Minister of War, objected to Shazly's plan to ask for any Arab support other than purely financial.⁸³ Shazly was successful and some degree of support was promised by several Arab countries. More important to the preparations, President Sadat convinced King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to subsidize Soviet Arms purchases, despite traditional distrust of the communists.⁸⁴

Having received approval for planning the assault, and assured of arms deliveries from the Soviet Union,

specifics of the crossing, now called Operation Badr, began in earnest. Timing was a crucial element: conditions of moonlight and the tidal flow in the Canal had to be carefully considered. The optimum time when these factors would allow the crossing fell in the month of Ramadan in the Islamic calendar, October in 1973.⁸⁵ Coordination with the Syrians was also a consideration. Not facing the same meteorological constraints the Syrians accepted the Egyptian timetable.

The other imperative was operational security in the broadest sense, including deception measures. The choice of attacking during the holy month of Ramadan, coinciding in 1973 with Yom Kippur, in itself, guaranteed some degree of surprise.⁸⁶ Arab rhetoric was another factor in the strategic deception, if a not entirely intentional one. President Sadat had called 1971 the "Year of Decision" and implied that there would have to be a resolution of the territorial issue or war.⁸⁷ The heat of his public statements had been alarming, but with the passage of time Israeli intelligence began to discount them as an indicator of impending hostilities.⁸⁸ Another factor working for the Egyptians was the general Israeli disregard for the capabilities of the Arab soldier or his leadership.⁸⁹

Timing of the attack also followed a long standing pattern of fall maneuvers. Using the ploy of a routine mobilization, the 22nd since January, the Egyptians began

concentrating forces in the forward area, ostensibly as a defensive measure. Mobilization itself is a significant indicator of hostilities, but as with President Sadat's public pronouncements, repetition had reduced them to a matter of routine.⁹⁰

The formal plan for Operation Badr called for six distinct parts. The first element called for a total of five infantry divisions, reinforced with an armored brigade, to assault across the Suez Canal along five sectors, each three miles wide. These sectors would not initially be in contact, rather they would be independent until a later consolidation and link-up. The second part of the plan was the destruction of the outposts in the Bar-Lev Line and defense against enemy counterattacks. Part three was the expansion of the initial bridgeheads to a depth of five miles and would last from H+18 to H+24 hours. The fourth part of the plan was the consolidation of the bridgeheads and would require all divisions to have closed the gaps between their initial landing sites within their respective army areas by H+48. By H+72 the Second and Third Armies were to close the gap between their bridgeheads to form a continuous front and to have penetrated six to nine miles into Sinai. Phase five was the building of secure defensive positions along this new consolidated front. The sixth, and last, phase was the large scale employment of airborne and

seaborne commando units to disrupt Israeli command, control, and reinforcement.⁹¹

Egypt's Second and Third Armies were ordered to begin moving into position on the 1st of October, 1973, and not for maneuvers. Also on the 1st, Egyptian submarines were ordered out of port to sail to their combat stations.⁹² Specially trained combat engineers conducted reconnaissance of the East Bank during the night of the 5th, and plugged the nozzles of the controversial system of pipes laid by the IDF to channel burning petroleum into the Canal in the event of attack.⁹³

The military instrument of politics was irrevocably committed to war as artillery fire opened up to cover the crossing of commandos in inflatable rubber boats at precisely 1405 on the 6th of October. Tactical surprise, if not strategic or operational surprise, was total. The Egyptian first wave, some 8,000 strong, was comprised of combat engineers, commandos, and infantry was scrambling up the sand ramparts of the Bar Lev line before the shocked Israelis knew they were there. By nightfall the water cannon had made openings in the sand ramparts for the first of the bridges to be secured to the East Bank.

Phase Two: The Crossing and Defense Against Counterattacks

Simply crossing the Canal was a significant achievement, but the bridgehead had to be consolidated, and heavy equipment rapidly concentrated on the East Bank to

ensure success against the inevitable counterattacks. Safe for the time being under the air defense envelope that extended from the West Bank across to the depth of the Egyptian positions on the East Bank, 10 bridges and 50 ferries began carrying elements of the Second Army in the north, and Third Army in the south into position.⁹⁴

Infantry, equipped with the ubiquitous Sagger anti-tank missile, quickly moved into forward positions to prepare for Israeli armor attacks.

The first wave across the Canal was made up of elite infantry, combat engineer, and commando troops. To provide for close and intermediate range protection against tanks large numbers of Soviet supplied RPG-7 rocket launchers, as well as the longer range Saggars were carried. To provide protection against low flying aircraft SA-7 Strella shoulder-fired heat seeking anti-aircraft missiles were also carried.⁹⁵

Since each soldier carried up to 70 pounds of ammunition and equipment specially designed carts had been provided to enhance mobility. This particular innovation was the work of General Shazly himself, who being an infantryman, knew that overloading his men would make their mission impossible to accomplish.⁹⁶ This is but one example of the minute detail that had gone into the planning of this operation.

Another example of the rigor of this planning was the tactical grouping of the commandos into assault groups by boat that would stay together not only during the crossing, but also throughout the assault as self-contained units. This first wave carried specially constructed lightweight assault ladders to enable the men to scale the ramparts. Color coded flags were set up as soon as the men were ashore to guide subsequent waves across the canal. Crossing points had been carefully selected to fall between the Outposts of the Bar-Lev line to allow the men time to rally without being under direct observation or fire.

The troops had been practicing these operations on similar obstacles, such as irrigation canals, and this training had clearly paid off: only seven minutes were required for the men to cross the Canal and begin scaling the rampart. This first wave, landed between outposts, bypassed the fortifications by design and moved quickly about 1000 meters east of the Canal to set up blocking positions. This disposition put them just on the west side of the second or third line of Israeli positions.⁹⁷

This initial success of the first phase of Operation Badr was, understandably, cause for euphoria in the Egyptian General Command Post. To President Sadat, General Ismail, and General Shazly the results of this first phase of the crossing were vindication of both the fighting qualities of the Egyptian soldier and the improvement in leadership in

the Egyptian Army since the Six Day War. It was all the more satisfying to Sadat because his Soviet advisors had been very skeptical about Egypt's chances for success.⁹⁸

All the success did not belong to the ground troops. Shazly, and then Air Force Chief of Staff Hosni Mubarak, had agreed that while the air defense envelope would protect the ground troops in the bridgeheads, the air force would have to strike Israeli targets in Sinai to assure victory. Mubarak may have had an extra incentive for these strikes. Shazly reports, perhaps apocryphally, that Sadat had joked with Mubarak's predecessor that he would hang him if the air force did not acquit itself better than it had in the 1967 Six Day War. Regardless of the possible pressure from Sadat, the air force struck airfields and command centers in Sinai including Bir Gifgafa, the suspected Southern Command forward command post, and the communications center at Um Kusheiba with some degree of success. The element of surprise was clearly a factor, and Egypt claims not to have lost any aircraft. The IDF claims not to have suffered any serious damage, and Egypt countered that they had intercepted frantic radio messages calling for help that indicated otherwise.⁹⁹ As with many controversies in this war, the exact details will probably never be known.

In the southern end of the crossing an amphibious force was not having as impressive a start. Approximately 1000 men in armored personnel carriers and PT-76 light tanks

had crossed the Great Bitter Lakes. Their mission was to cross the lakes at the one location on the East Bank that they could climb without engineer support and race to the Giddi and Mitla Passes to prevent the IDF from reinforcing the Bar-Lev Line. The PT-76 is not a main battle tank, however, and when this force was confronted by Israeli M-60s and Centurions it was driven back with heavy losses.¹⁰⁰

While the first reports were optimistic, there were some problems on the first day of the war. The crossing sites in the Second Army area, in the north, were on schedule and the bridges were being assembled despite some fire from the Israelis. In the south, in Third Army's area, the operation was not going entirely according to plan. The ramparts in this sector were composed not just of sand, but hard-packed earth, and not as easy to cut with the water cannon. Tides in this sector are greater than in the north and this also interfered with the work of assembling the bridges. By the end of the day the twelve bridges planned for the Second Army sector were operational and in use; none of the Third Army's bridges had been completed.¹⁰¹

Considering the odds against success, and the inherent difficulty of a river crossing operation, the Egyptians had ample reason for pride. Unfortunately, the complex plan depended on exact timing and the time table was already thrown off. Euphoria can be a drug as dangerous as heroin, and the high command should have realized that they

were a long way from safe; that the IDF was not beaten, only shocked.

Phase Three: Consolidation and Attacks Out of the Bridgehead

The first day of the October War ended with the Israelis reeling, and the Egyptians confident of victory. War is the archetypical human activity: fraught with uncertainty, but exhilarating when everything is going well. In the first phase of the attack the Egyptian leaders were free to concentrate on their plans and the primacy of the operational level of war. Initial success, paradoxically, was to bring conflict between Generals Ismail and Shazly, and between General Shazly and President Sadat, over the goals and objectives of this war.

The first waves had deliberately bypassed the forts of the Bar-Lev Line. The second phase of the war required the divisions of the Second and Third Armies to link up and consolidate their respective positions, and ultimately to form a continuous line north to south. In order to accomplish this the Bar-Lev Line had to be secured at the same time that armored counterattacks were defeated. While the Egyptian first wave had totally bypassed the strongpoints, subsequent waves had the mission of encircling them. Determined infantry assaults, along with artillery and air attacks, rendered several posts ineffective on the first day. There is some disagreement about when the

positions began to fall. Egyptian sources indicate that several, including fortress 1 at Qantara East were occupied on the afternoon of the 6th of October.¹⁰² Clearly, by the afternoon of the 7th of October most of the strongpoints were in Egyptian hands, and no longer posed a threat.¹⁰³

To effect the consolidation required more than the infantry that had occupied the first positions on the 6th. Each division had been reinforced by an additional armored brigade. With the bridges in the Second Army sector secure, tanks began moving to the East Bank on the night of 6-7 October. Half of the Egyptian armor was in the infantry brigades, one organic tank battalion in each brigade. The remaining tanks, primarily T-62s, were organized in pure armor brigades. In the first 24 hours the Egyptians moved over 1000 tanks across the Canal. The mission of the armor brigades was to make the Egyptian defensive positions invulnerable to IDF tank attacks. Fortunately for the Egyptians, the first counterattacks were made by small units of pure armor. Unable to protect themselves against the infantry's guided anti-tank missiles, these attacks were repulsed at great loss to the Israelis.¹⁰⁴

The 7th of October was a relatively quiet day on the battlefield, allowing the Egyptians time to continue concentrating their forces on the East Bank. The situation on the Golan was considered so serious to the Israelis that the priority of air support was shifted to the north,

further contributing to the relative calm.¹⁰⁵ The forward edge of the Egyptian positions had been pushed almost six miles deep into Sinai, and all but two of the Bar-Lev forts were occupied. The air defense envelope continued to protect the bridgehead, although the Israelis had damaged some sections of the bridges. The only reason for concern at this stage of the battle was a 25 mile gap between the Second and Third Armies. This problem was complicated by the fact that this gap was not protected by air defense assets, making a link-up extremely hazardous.¹⁰⁶

While an enemy's mistakes are not the same thing as a friendly triumph, the counterattacks of the 8th of October further buoyed Egyptian confidence. The Israelis' continued to attack with pure armor formations into the teeth of the prepared defense, losing large numbers of tanks, and crews. This is not to minimize the feats that the Egyptians had performed, simply to underscore the reality that the IDF was not reacting with its usual tactical flair.

A period of relative calm persisted through the 13th of October. Fighting did take place, and the Egyptians had lost upwards of 200 tanks, fighting off the persistent, if not determined Israeli counterattacks. The Egyptian Air Force continued to attack targets in the Sinai, but their results were not significant.¹⁰⁷

During this period, beginning as early as the 6th of October, the Soviet Ambassador had approached President

Sadat with a request to consider a cease-fire due to Syrian reverses. The United States had called for a cease-fire in the United Nations on the first day, but, with the Arabs seemingly victorious on all fronts, the Soviets refused to endorse it. Sadat, flushed with the good news from the front, resented the interference. He refused to believe that the situation on the Syrian front could be so grave as to require such a desperate move. The situation becomes difficult to unravel. Sadat called Syrian President Hafez al Asad to try to confirm the Soviet reports that the Syrian Army was in danger of defeat only to be told it was completely untrue. The Soviet Ambassador returned the same evening to tell Sadat that Syria had again asked for a cease-fire.¹⁰⁸ It is possible that both the ambassador, and Sadat were telling the truth. It is highly likely that Asad would have been willing to ask for Soviet assistance, and at the same time, be unwilling to admit to Sadat that his forces were not as successful as the Egyptians.

Friction was not restricted to the diplomatic level. Encouraged by the initial performance of the army against the IDF counterattacks, and the Israeli losses, General Shazly recommended an attack out of the defensive positions toward El Arish along the coast road, against the objections of General Ismail.¹⁰⁹ In his book about the war, Shazly denies this, but many sources agree the idea was his. A situation between the two men developed that was not

dissimilar to the acrimony between Gonen and Sharon. Obviously hostility at this level can have a serious effect on the conduct of operations. Complicating the situation, Ismail, as overall commander of the Arab forces, had received a urgent request on the 11th of October from Mustafa Tlas, his Syrian counterpart, to launch an attack to distract the IDF and thereby to relieve pressure in the Golan. By accident or design the attack was postponed until the 14th of October.¹¹⁰

The attack was doomed to failure from the start. The Egyptians had been taking steady losses in tanks, losses that could not be made good during the war. Tank strength was now down to about 780, as opposed to over 900 Israeli tanks in the Sinai. Further reducing the chances of success was the plan itself. Six separate armored thrusts were ordered, three in each army sector. Not learning a lesson from the IDF's early problems, the attacks were to be undertaken by armor without accompanying infantry. Initial penetrations were successful. and the reports from the field to Cairo were optimistic as always. The Egyptians lost nearly 300 tanks in these abortive attacks, and more serious for the outcome of the war, General Mamoun, Second Army's commander suffered a heart attack and had to be replaced.¹¹¹

On balance this phase of the fighting was not decisive in itself. While Egypt had suffered serious

losses, particularly in tanks, the bridgeheads were still intact. The gap between the Second and Third Armies had not been eliminated however, and air attacks on the bridges were taking a toll despite the air defense envelope.

Phase Four: Isolation of the East Bank and Cease Fire

Even though the attack of the 14th of October had failed, cautious optimism still persisted among the Egyptian leaders. What they did not yet know was that the strong counterattacks against Second Army's southern flank were the prelude to the Israeli assault across to the West Bank of the Suez Canal near Deversoir. Further complicating the military picture were increasing conflicts between Sadat, Shazly, and Ismail. The role of the superpowers, now both pressing for a cease-fire, became pivotal. Sadat and Shazly were convinced that the United States had begun conducting high altitude reconnaissance flights over the Canal on the 15th of October to provide Israel with detailed imagery of Egyptian dispositions. It is clear that, whatever the facts of the situation may have been, the tide of battle had crested for the Egyptians by the 16th of October.

General Shazly had become convinced on the night of the 15th of October that a change in plan was necessary. After the abortive attacks of the 14th-15th of October he approached Ismail and recommended that the 4th and 21st Armored Divisions be withdrawn from the bridgehead to the West Bank to act as a reserve. He reasoned that since the

aggressive tank attacks had failed it would be prudent to stay on the defensive on the East Bank, relying on anti-tank weapons to defend against Israeli attacks.¹¹²

By the night of the 16th the Egyptians realized that the Israelis had succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal, and had a force of undetermined size on the West Bank. It is unlikely that this realization had any effect on Sadat's decision to accede to the Soviet call for a cease-fire on the 15th of October. This decision was more likely prompted by the unsuccessful attacks of the 14th of October.¹¹³

Sadat was also concerned about the resupply efforts by the United States on behalf of Israel.¹¹⁴ Whatever the reason, Sadat realized that he could not allow the Israelis to remain on the West Bank, and ordered Shazly to personally oversee the counterattack. He claims to have ordered Shazly to attack the Israelis on the East Bank to prevent more crossings, while mopping up the penetration on the West Bank with commandos.¹¹⁵ Shazly immediately went to the front to survey the situation for himself. Here the exact events become a matter of speculation. Shazly said he had a plan to reduce the Israeli bridgehead, relying on the armored formations he had recommended to Ismail be withdrawn from the East bank.¹¹⁶ The local garrison commander had assured Ismail that the force was no more than a raiding party, and that he could handle the situation without help.

At this point, the 17th through the 19th of October, the Egyptians had two problems: a penetration of unknown strength on the West Bank; and a growing conflict between Shazly and Ismail. Ismail had ordered Shazly to report the situation on the ground as he saw it. Shazly returned from his trip convinced that the situation was grave, and recommended that an evacuation of the forces on the East Bank begin at once. He felt that the Israelis would reinforce their bridgehead at once and attack the Egyptians in the rear, and perhaps even try to advance on Cairo.¹¹⁷ Ismail and Sadat became convinced that Shazly had overestimated the gravity of the situation. Sadat described him as "a nervous wreck."¹¹⁸ Sadat called a meeting of senior commanders and asked their opinion of the situation. Since none were as pessimistic as Shazly, he ordered Ismail to relieve him that day (the 20th of October) and replace him with General Gamasy.¹¹⁹ Ironically, Shazly's gloomy predictions were to prove highly accurate in the days ahead.¹²⁰

Despite his conviction that the situation was not hopeless, Sadat decided on the evening of the 20th of October to press for a cease-fire. Like Ismail, he was unwilling to give up the newly liberated territory in the Sinai, but he did not want to wait until the Israelis resumed the offensive.¹²¹ Influencing his decision was the problem of resupply. The Soviets were unwilling, or unable,

to provide resupply of sufficient quantity of critically needed supplies, such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

The situation was becoming critical on the West Bank. The Israeli ground troops were succeeding where her air force had failed: they were destroying Egypt's air defense envelope on the ground. As more and more missile sites were overrun, more Israeli aircraft appeared to provide air support. The bridges, always Egypt's weak link, were coming under unrelenting air attack.

On the 22nd of October, a cease-fire was to go into effect. The Israelis were not finished, however, and violated the cease fire within two hours of the effective time. Predictably both sides blamed the other, but clearly only Israel stood to gain by prolonging the war. The IDF was concerned because although they had successfully crossed the Canal, and reduced the Egyptian air defenses, the Third Army was still intact. Using reinforcements from the Syrian front, the Israelis pressed their attack to the outskirts of Suez. The Third Army did indeed become cut off.¹²²

At this point a confrontation between the superpowers, building for more than a week, was narrowly averted by earnest arm twisting. The Soviets prevailed on the Egyptians, and the United States on the Israelis, to accept the U.N. mandated cease-fire on the 25th of October. This time it was observed, and the war was finally over.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

As stated in Chapter One, the purpose of this paper is to examine limitations placed on combatants other than those posed by actions on the battlefield. Specifically, limitations of a political nature that arise within the armed forces, between the armed forces and their respective governments, and imposed by political forces outside of the government. In the case of Israel and Egypt in the October War these limitations had a significant effect on the outcome of the war. They determined the timing of the initiation of hostilities, they had an influence on force structure and performance in combat, they determined the goals and objectives of the combatants, and they determined the outcome by the timing of the cease-fire. Further, they have greatly influenced the post-conflict situation, and the potential for future conflict.

While not resulting directly from the events of this war, but at least influenced by it, the U. S. has developed a system to limit the importance of these factors as dysfunctional interference, or distractors, in the management of conflict. Like all human activity, politics

and war cannot be isolated from personalities, but law, regulation, and system, can mitigate their most negative influence. In the course of the last twenty years several laws have been enacted that have fundamentally altered how the U. S. armed forces relate to their civilian leadership and to each other. In particular the War Powers Resolution of 1973, and the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, have laid down, or codified, specific, if not entirely unambiguous, roles for the Executive and Legislative Branches of government and the military leadership in their preparation for, execution, and management of, the "military instrument" of politics. I deliberately use the term politics, rather than power, because it more closely captures the complexity and social nature of armed conflict.

The future is said to be clouded with the potential for regional conflicts like the October War. Recent history in the Persian Gulf and in Europe, where regional or ethnic conflicts are currently raging in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, would seem to support this contention. The National Security Strategy of the United States of January 1993, the last of the Bush administration, specifically states:

Militarily, global security is threatened by regional instabilities which we may have to confront either to protect our own citizens and interests or at the request of our allies or the United Nations.¹²³

The Defense Strategy for the 1990s, also published in January 1993, formulated to support and compliment the National Security Strategy, puts the problem more precisely:

We can take advantage of the Cold War's end and the dissolution of the Soviet Union to shift our planning focus to regional threats and challenges. The future of events in major regions remains uncertain. Regional and local actors may pursue hostile agendas through direct confrontation or through such indirect means as subversion and terrorism.¹²⁴

The events of the October War indicate the potential complexity of regional conflicts and offer some lessons learned for the future.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the Israeli problems, particularly with indications of impending conflict, and the friction internal to the senior officer ranks of the IDF may at first seem to be alien to the American national character. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the influx of Chinese "Volunteers" in the Korean War, and the violence of the 1968 Tet Offensive in Viet Nam are all eloquent testimony to the costs of being surprised, and the susceptibility of the U.S. to misread an intelligence indicator. The relationship between General Douglas MacArthur and President Harry Truman during the Korean War illustrates the potential for disagreement over goals and objectives between a military leader and his civilian commander in chief during a war.

Recently, the brief appearance of a disagreement between President Bush and General Schwarzkopf over the

timing of the end of hostilities in the ground war against Iraq during operation DESERT STORM offers a possible example of what the future holds for friction in the post Goldwater-Nichols era. While honest misunderstandings among honest men can be expected, the incident as portrayed in the press seemed to run deeper and suggest a fundamental difference in aims, not simply a miscommunication. It is true that General Schwarzkopf immediately backed down in the face of strident media inquiries about the incident, but he was not as secure in his person or position as General MacArthur was in facing President Truman, who was relatively unpopular at the time.

The most important feature of both incidents is the unchallenged primacy of political goals. In the October War both the Egyptians and the Israelis experienced similar friction between military and civilian leaders. In Egypt's case President Sadat actually relieved General Shazly during the conflict because of fundamental differences over the prosecution of the war.

While it may be impossible to avoid this type of conflict among leaders in future wars it is important to recognize the disastrous effect they can have on combat operations. When serious friction does occur the only remedy may be to remove its source. If General Gonen had been allowed to relieve General Sharon early in the campaign the Southern Front would certainly have been easier to

manage. Unfortunately the political interference guaranteed by Sharon's Likud connection, despite the fact that his party was not in power, continued until the cease-fire, sometimes with near tragic results.

The two American examples cited above, General MacArthur versus President Truman and the probably mild misunderstanding between President Bush and General Schwarzkopf, are not as dramatic as the incidents of the October War. The October War however was fought for higher stakes than the Gulf War and the Korean War: the U.S. home front was never threatened in the way that all combatants were in the October War. Israel's national survival may not have been at issue, but destruction of cities and potentially high civilian casualties were possible.

Conflict between leaders during the conduct of a war must be related to their underlying fears and concerns. In the October War these fears increased the pressure of the decision making process to the point where rational judgements could not be made.

The U.S. is no less susceptible to this phenomenon, it simply has not been placed in the same degree of risk for some considerable period of time, probably not since the Cuban Missile Crisis. We can do little more than hope that reason will outweigh emotion if faced with a crisis of the magnitude that faced Egypt and Israel in the October War.

The lesson for future Presidents and Commanders in Chief to learn is to stop this infighting as soon as it occurs or the real fighting on the battlefield will be jeopardized. The only solution is to train military leaders to accept the primacy of the political system without making them slaves to it, beholden to politicians or parties for promotion and position. Solving the problem of friction among military leaders is more difficult. No amount of training will insure good will, but if the Israeli political leadership had supported the military chain of command that they were responsible for, Gonen would have fired Sharon early in the war and saved many lives in the process.

It is as important, if not more so, for the civilian leadership to know when not to use force as when and how to use it. The civilian leadership of the armed forces, bureaucratic and elected, must be trained in, or at least exposed to, the technical and doctrinal aspects of military art. Without a common understanding of the proper employment of the military instrument, confusion, ill will, and needless loss of life may result.

To begin assessing the implications of the October War it is helpful to return to Clausewitz and put the conflict first in a classical theoretical setting. It is important to set aside the rhetoric that Egyptian war aims were anything but limited. President Sadat had no intention of challenging Israel's right to exist or survive as a

state. The October War clearly fits within Clausewitz's framework of political purpose:

It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy's forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.¹²⁵

This is a much more precise expression of the object of the war than the time honored "war is an extension of politics by other means." Clearly Egypt did not gain any new allies, but the October War did favorably affect the political situation and was a shorter route to the goal of restoring lost territories than waiting for the purely political process of negotiations through intermediaries and the U. N.

The military leadership clearly accepted this limitation of the conflict, as General Shazly said

It was impossible for us to launch a large-scale offensive to destroy the enemy concentrations in Sinai or to force enemy withdrawal from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. All that our capabilities would permit was a limited attack.¹²⁶

The secondary aim of restoring self esteem to the Egyptian armed forces was also achieved despite reverses at the end of the war and the successful Israeli crossing to the West Bank of the Canal. The ultimate political goal of regaining lost territory would require mediation, particularly by the U. S., and much time was to pass, but it

appears unlikely to have had a chance of happening at all without a recourse to the military instrument of politics. Every success enjoyed by the use of the military instrument makes its future use even more likely.

The Egyptian Situation

The dominance of civilian authority in Egypt, a state that was certainly not democratic by U. S. standards, is an important factor. The Egyptian Minister of War and Commander in Chief, General Ismail was brought out of retirement to assume his post in 1971. Although a military man and former officer, like President Sadat himself, Ismail exercised his authority through the mechanism of Egypt's constitution and in concert with the President, he did not abrogate or usurp authority during the conduct of the war.¹²⁷ General Shazly likewise did not try to subvert the political system even though he came to disagree violently with both President Sadat, and General Ismail, his "National Command Authorities." He accepted Sadat's decision to relieve him from his post during the war even though convinced that his superiors were making disastrously wrong operational decisions.¹²⁸ Although there was to be much finger pointing after the war -- Sadat maintaining that the reverses of 17-19 October 1973 had caused Shazly to lose his nerve, Shazly that Sadat had virtually thrown away the Egyptian army by not making a timely withdrawal from the

East Bank -- during the war the integrity of constitutional or lawful control was maintained.¹²⁹

The Israeli Dilemma

Israel, clearly closer to the American concept of democracy, was similarly faced with significant friction among its leaders over the question of objectives or ends in the October War. Faced with an invasion the decision to resist with the military instrument was a fait accompli, there was obviously no other recourse, save preemption. The decision not to preempt, controversial to this day, was conditioned by political factors. While seemingly a military decision, necessitated in Israeli doctrine by her territorial limitations, and the small size of her armed forces relative to her adversaries, preemption carries the risk of censure and loss of support. As an astute Israeli author, Ariel Levite, has pointed out:

The sheer military logic underlying preemptive strikes (and for that matter preemptive wars as well), i.e., the benefit of initiative and surprise, is reinforced in Israel's case by a combination of military and political factors. Israel's inferiority in the balance of forces (especially standing armies), as well as the requirement for a rapid, clear and visible victory prior to superpower intervention, have all converged to enhance the appeal of preemption for Israel. But the nature of superpower involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict was perceived to undermine the persuasiveness of the military preemption rational.¹³⁰

In the hours preceding the initiation of hostilities the option of preemption was considered. In her memoirs

Prime Minister Golda Meir described the process that led to the decision not to preempt:

Dado (IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar) was in favor of a preemptive strike since it was clear that war was inevitable in any case. "I want you to know," he said, "that our air force can be ready to strike at noon, but you must give me the green light now. If we can make the first strike, it will be greatly to our advantage." But I had already made up my mind. "Dado," I said, "I know all the arguments in favor of a preemptive strike, but I am against it. We don't know now, any of us, what the future will hold, but there is always the possibility that we will need help, and if we strike first, we will get nothing from anyone."¹³¹

The possibility then that preemption would be interpreted as aggression, and therefore would be politically unacceptable to the superpowers, particularly the U. S., despite its obvious military advantages, demonstrates the importance, not only of the dominance of the political process, but of the influence of the perceptions of the superpowers in the context of a regional conflict. It is arguable whether preemption at this late hour would have materially affected the eventual outcome of the Egyptian attack (the above conversation took place on the morning the war began), but it is significant that a political decision was made against the advice of the military not to exercise the option.

As was the case in Egypt, much recrimination followed the October War in Israel. An independent inquiry, the Agranat Commission was empaneled to study the war and apportion blame among the Israeli leadership, military and civilian. The complete report has not been released, but

what is known is highly critical of virtually everyone. The stridency of the spate of memoirs that followed, especially Prime Minister Meir's and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan's, indicate the strong political repercussions of this war. Fueled by the relatively high casualty figures (which are a matter of much speculation since they, like the Agranat Commission report, have never been made public, although they are said to have approached 3000 dead), Israeli public reaction was one of outrage.¹³² Many changes resulted, both systemic and political. Prime Minister Meir resigned in April of 1974 in the wake of the release of the Agranat Interim Report that, while not specifically critical of her, was generally critical of the government's handling of the war. The report also called for the creation of the position of special advisor on intelligence to the Prime Minister to act as an independant voice on intelligence issues.

The Role of Intelligence

Intelligence agencies or bureaucracies are always a ready scapegoat in the case of surprise in war. The case of the October War is no exception to this rule. The surprise achieved by the Egyptians as elaborated in Chapters Two and Three was due to a combination of factors. The elaborate Egyptian deception plans, excellent operational security, and the underestimation of Egyptian capabilities by Israel all played a part. A lack of flexibility on the part of

Israel, particularly its unshakable belief in "The Concept," was a contributing factor in Egypt's success. Conventional logic, as typified by Roberta Wohlstetter's paradigm of ambiguity of intelligence indicators as the principal reason for surprise, might possibly explain part of the reason for Israel's slow reaction, but as she admits:

...it is much easier after the event to sort the relevant from the irrelevant signals. After the event, of course, a signal is always crystal clear; we can now see what disaster it was signaling, since the disaster has occurred. But before the event it is obscure and pregnant with conflicting meanings.¹³³

It is certainly the primary goal of an intelligence system to provide policy makers with timely warning: to prevent conflict by political intervention, or failing that, to provide ample time for initiation of hostilities on favorable terms.

The factor of surprise in war may be a more complex phenomenon, however, and not so easy to prevent. A more relevant appreciation of the surprise factor in war may be that offered by Richard Betts. Betts believes the effects of surprise may be almost unavoidable:

Numerous and disparate cases reveal that attempts to achieve military surprise in the initial phase of war usually succeed. The principle cause of surprise is not the failure of intelligence but the unwillingness of political leaders to believe intelligence or to react to it with sufficient dispatch. Politicians' reluctance to authorize military response to early warning is rarely due to stupidity or negligence. Rather, it is due to concern, sometimes justifiable, that military reaction may worsen the crisis and decrease the chances of avoiding war.¹³⁴

Prime Minister Meir, as previously noted, was not so much concerned with avoiding war as avoiding the political consequences of appearing to have initiated hostilities. There is no question of stupidity or negligence on her part, it is simply the primacy of political over purely military considerations.

There is no intelligence system, bureaucratic or mechanical, that can eliminate these political factors. The only way of avoiding or mitigating the effects of surprise is to ensure that decision makers are provided with the best available intelligence in a timely fashion. Systems, both human and automated, have been devised to address this problem, but secrecy makes it difficult to evaluate them objectively.

Intelligence did play a significant role in the conduct of operations in the war. Sadat and Shazly remained convinced that the products of aerial reconnaissance by U.S. SR-71 aircraft and satellites were provided to the IDF and gave Israel the decisive edge in the Sinai by giving the IDF an exact picture of Egyptian dispositions, and therefore their tactical vulnerabilities.¹³⁵ It is doubtful that Israel would have failed to conduct a counterattack in the absence of this information, and it is unclear what intelligence exactly the Israelis did receive during the war, but it remains significant that the Egyptians felt at a distinct disadvantage.

Implications for the United States

While the exact conditions of the October War will never be repeated, (and all wars are unique), there are some enduring lessons to consider. The demise of the bipolar world may mean that the threat of confrontation between nuclear superpowers over a regional conflict is no longer even a remote possibility. Confrontation at some level, however, is not only a possibility, but a certainty.

Russian leaders still have traditional interests outside their boundaries. Despite glasnost and perestroika, Soviet advisors were reluctant to abandon Iraq during the Gulf War after decades of association. In the former Yugoslavia, Russia's historical role of protector of her Slavic Serbian brothers remains a complication in the search for peace. Regional tensions then still offer the potential for wider conflicts.

Political limitations in the form of international reaction are still a significant factor. The news coverage of the decimation of Iraqi troops on the "highway of death" south of Basra during operation DESERT STORM, and the concern over the perception in the region, and at home, of the U. S. as a vindictive conqueror, may have had a disproportionate effect on the timing of the cease-fire. The President had to consider the reactions of his coalition partners, traditional allies, and his own population, to the

specter of the U.S. armed forces seeming engaged in the slaughter of fleeing, ragtag, beaten soldiers.

The politicization of the intelligence process, a vocal issue during the confirmation hearings of former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates, remains an unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable problem. While it may be without a systemic antidote, professionalism and trust between the national leadership, civilian and military, and the intelligence agencies may mitigate the problem. In the October War this trust was eroded in both Egypt and Israel by reverses on the battlefield. A realistic understanding of the uses and limitations of intelligence is critical to the process of rational decision making, particularly when armed conflict is a possibility.

War remains the quintessential human activity, subject to all the vicissitudes that man and fate can supply. As a human activity it can never be conducted without some degree of friction among decision makers, military and civilian. In the October War this friction probably cost lives because it impeded the ability of staffs, commanders, and politicians to make critical decisions rationally and quickly. It also deprived them of their objectivity at crucial moments, such as when President Sadat failed to take General Shazly's warning of the Israeli Crossing of the Suez seriously. The lesson to be learned here is simply to remain aware that the phenomenon exists,

and must be ruthlessly dealt with when it occurs to prevent organizational paralysis, such as that experienced by the Israelis on the Southern Front.

There is a practical military lesson to be learned from the October War that has particular importance during a time of reduced military budgets and falling active force end strengths. As discussed in Chapter Three, one of General Shazly's first priorities as Chief of Staff was to reorganize the Egyptian mobilization system and increase the readiness of the reserves. Shazly also improved the quality of the average Egyptian conscript by drafting students. This qualitative improvement was an important element in the Egyptian success, and a reminder that the U.S. can ill afford to reduce the quality of its military manpower, especially as the size of the armed forces is reduced. Israel also depended on rapid mobilization of her reserves, the standing forces of the IDF being insignificant when compared to Egypt or Syria, although of very high quality. Neither country could afford a standing army large enough to guarantee security. While the capability of the U. S. Armed Forces far exceeds that of any one potential adversary, multiple regional conflicts would require a system of efficient mobilization of competent military manpower to compensate for lower force levels.

The utility of the military instrument of politics is clearly undiminished. Despite the formation of policy

groups with government support for the study of conflict avoidance, the utility of force as a method of resolving political questions has not been abandoned in the twenty years since the October War. If anything, the use of force is on the rise as a new wave of nationalism sweeps across the world. From the Horn of Africa to Bosnia armed force is being used as a means of changing boundaries and moving populations.

For all of these reasons the October War remains an valuable conflict to study. With the passing of time, and the declassification of more material, particularly Israeli documents such as the full text of the Agranat Commission report, some more definite conclusions may be drawn. The human dimension of the conflict that seems so important today may be put into clearer perspective as more facts become known. A full opening of Syrian archives, or publication of memoirs from leaders on that side of the conflict would add an important missing piece

Two indisputable truths remain: it is far cheaper to avoid a war than to fight one; and the avoidance of war requires flexibility, delicate judgement, and perhaps, a commitment to justice and compromise. These qualities belong more to the political and diplomatic instruments of power, than to the military. Substituting them for armed conflict will require a degree of understanding not often seen in the past.

The use of the United Nations as a mechanism to deal effectively with this potential for conflict, and reduce its destructiveness, appears to be gaining greater international acceptance and offers some small hope for the future. The increased potential for regional conflicts like the October War may be mitigated by the desire of the world community to avoid them.

Failing the prevention of conflict by diplomacy, the military will inevitably be called upon to change the circumstances, whether by the use of overwhelming combat power, gradual or incremental use of force, or simply peacemaking operations. A careful study of the October War will prepare politicians and soldiers alike for the consequences of allowing political frictions to disrupt rational policy on the battlefield or off.

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